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Abstract—with the ever fast developments of technologies in 
science and engineering, it is believed that CAV (connected and 
autonomous vehicles) will come into our daily life soon. CAV 
could be used in many different aspects in our lives such as 
public transportation and agriculture, and so on. Although CAV 
will bring huge benefits to our lives and society, issues such as 
cyber security threats, which may reveal drivers’ private 
information or even pose threat to driver’s life, present 
significant challenges before CAV can be utilised in our society. 
In computer science, there is a clear category of cyber security 
attacks while there is no specific survey on cyber security of 
CAV. This paper overviews different passive and active cyber 
security attacks which may be faced by CAV. We also present 
solutions of each of these attacks based on the current state-of-
the-art, and discuss future improvements in research on CAV 
cyber security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
With the fast development of technology, autonomous 
driving is becoming to one of the mostly investigated issues 
around the whole world. According to the Boston Consulting 
Group Report [3], the market size of autonomous driving will 
reach 42 billion dollars by 2025. Different companies, from 
traditional car manufacturers such as BMW to emerging 
internet based companies such as Google [4], are investing 
enormous human efforts and money into the development of 
connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV) or driverless 
vehicles. These vehicles are all connected, have access to 
internet, and communicate with the surrounding environments 
via different sensors without drivers’ involvement [5].  
Public have also showed great interest in the realization of 
CAV. According to an observation report conducted by 
Cetelem in 2015 [1], 81% of the drivers said they wish to drive 
a 100% autonomous car in 10 years. Moreover, lots of 
countries also issue laws to support the legality of CAV and 
allocate space for the CAV developers to conduct field tests, 
including Detroit Motor City [6] and Silicon Valley [7] in the 
USA. In 2016, 20 states in USA introduced legislations of 
autonomous vehicles [8]. In Ibaraki, Japan, a 15km2 test field 
will be put into use from 2017 [9]. In China, the first CAV test 
field, the National Intelligent Connected Vehicle (Shanghai) 
Pilot Zone, was set up in Shanghai [10]. The friendly 
development environment promotes the research and 
development of CAV around the world. It is believed that 2021 
will be the beginning year of CAV’s utilisation from technical 
perspective [11]. Though, there are still some concerns about 
the CAV such as morality and safety. 
CAV could be used in a number of scenarios such as public 
transportation, surveying and mapping, etc. Along with the 
convenience it brings to our daily life, CAV are also faced with 
lots of safety issues. CAV usually use sensors to perceive the 
surrounding environments to model, and plan accordingly the 
following decisions and movements. In addition, the V2X 
(Vehicle to everything) communications allow CAV to 
communicate with other vehicles, pedestrians and 
infrastructure. One CAV could be equipped with various 
platforms to realize complex functions. After 2009, plenty of 
car manufacturers produced vehicles with internet access and 
entertainment devices, which are vulnerable to hacking 
regardless of their make or model. In 2015, two white hat 
hackers attacked a Jeep Grand Cherokee successfully [2], the 
results could be dangerous if such skills are used 
inappropriately. 
The most effective way is to physically isolate the car with 
the outside environment, however, users need vehicles to 
communicate with the whole environment to get information, it 
is impossible to isolate the vehicles [12]. This paper concerns 
cyber security in CAV, and discusses problems faced and 
generated by CAV. Possible defence methods for cyber 
security attacks in CAV will also be discussed. 
 
II. CYBER SECURITY ATTACKS FACED BY CAV 
In computer science field, the cyber security attacks are 
divided into 2 main parts and 6 more detailed parts [13]. 
However, in cyber security of CAV, there is no specific 
category. 
Considering that CAV is kind of mobile computer, the 
communication theory is similar to the Internet 
communication, the cyber security in CAV could also be 
divided into 2 main parts, which are passive attacks and active 
attacks. 
A. Passive Attacks 
Passive attacks eavesdrop or monitor the transmissions 
between users, where the attackers cannot modify or change 
the content in the transmission, and would not interact with the 
data transmitted [14]. Passive attacks most probably faced by 
CAV include the follows: 
 Eavesdropping and Release of the Information. During 
the usage of CAV, the attacker could eavesdrop the 
vehicle’s situation and the communication message 
sent between the V2X communication channels. The 
messages include destination between the driver and 
the vehicle. In addition, in future CAV where the V2X 
communications play  more important roles, attackers 
could eavesdrop communication messages between the 
vehicles or with the infrastructure and pedestrians, thus 
more private information could be monitored by 
attackers without permissions. Such information could 
be released to companies of a range of interests, or 
may lead to further physical damages to drivers. 
 Traffic Analysis. To certain extend, CAV designers 
could address the eavesdropping problem and use 
cryptography to encrypt the messages thus only 
authenticated users or devices could decrypt the 
content. However, attackers could also use traffic 
analysis method to obtain the length and time of these 
messages, and with such information, could gather 
further information such as the time the car is used, 
and thus user’s working time and time of their daily 
activities.  
 
Normally, passive attacks are difficult to identify because 
the attackers do not modify the content in the message. The 
receiver and sender are not aware of that there is a ‘man’ 
between them. CAV manufacturers however could prevent the 
attacks while designing the vehicles to encrypt not only the 
messages but also the communication channels. In conclusion, 
to deal with passive attacks in CAV, defending and protecting 
is more important than fixing passive attacks. 
 
B. Active Attacks 
Despite passive attacks, attackers are more likely to take 
actions to modify or damage the messages and the data 
transmitted in active attacks [15]. These could cause much 
more damages than passive attacks especially in the CAV 
environment, and cause fatal injuries to drivers. In CAV, active 
attacks could be divided into four categories, which are listed 
below: 
 Spoofing. Spoofing attack is conducted by faking 
identities or data. This happens when an unauthorised 
attacker pretends to be an authorised user. For example, 
the attacker pretends to be a nearby vehicle, and sends 
a wrong location to the driver. If the driver believes 
that there is no obstacle in front of the car, it may cause 
a serious accident. Moreover, attackers could also 
falsely report a fake car accident to the service 
platform. Other vehicles using the platform may be 
influenced to make wrong decisions based on the false 
information. It is crucial to authenticate the service 
provider and the drivers in this scenario. For example, 
it is more reliable to find a third party organization to 
store the authentication information. Such method is 
also widely taken by banks nowadays. In addition, new 
algorithms and frameworks also need to be established 
to filter false information and messages. For example, 
if there are 10 vehicles nearby, and 9 of them reported 
a traffic jam while only one said there is not, it is 
essential to check the authenticity of the messages of 
last one. 
 Replay Attack. Attackers could intercept the message 
with authentication from sender to receiver, and resend 
the message to the receiver to obtain the authenticated 
access to the service. In CAV, this could also happen. 
Attackers do not need to know the content inside the 
package, so the encryption of data is useless in this 
attack. However, we could still use challenge response 
to deal with replay attacks, where after the sender 
sends a message, the receiver could send the challenge 
value and sender responds to it to get the 
authentication access. 
 Modification. In this kind of attacks, attackers could 
modify the message such as GPS information between 
the communication channels. In 2016, a location-based 
reality game named Pokémon Go attracted millions of 
game players around the whole world. This game is 
based on GPS information. After installing the game 
on game players’ phones, the players could track 
Pokémon in different locations worldwide. As not all 
types of Pokémon are available at all locations around 
the world, to get specific Pokémon they want, some 
game players modified the GPS positioning data of 
their phones. Some players also sell the modify 
equipment online [16]. The company Nintendo has 
developed some methods to detect players who 
modified the data by identifying those players who 
move too fast, or who have collected specific Pokémon 
that are not in players local areas. In the end, Nintendo 
banned all the accounts that falsely modified GPS data. 
In CAV, the attackers could also easily modify their 
locations by using this method. Car manufacturers 
could design protocols or algorithms to detect the 
falsely modified data and punish the driver, for example, 
use the machine learning method to filter the data, like 
the technology now used in email account to tell spam. 
GPS data could also be used into the process because 
each car will generate huge amount of location data 
every day. The inspection method can also be combined 
with the GPS data processing procedure to clean useless 
data. 
 Denial of Service (DoS). DoS attacks will block the 
access to the target server [17] by making use of flaws 
in the system or protocol to send huge amount of data, 
or request to interfere the receivers’ network. This 
attack may cause delay and breakdown of the 
receivers’ response. In some situations, delay may be 
not serious. However in CAV, the request of time is 
comparatively really high, and one second could cause 
or avoid an accident. If one vehicle could not process 
the data received, the vehicle could cause injuries to 
people. To avoid this kind of attacks, system need to 
be checked and updated frequently, and the protocols 
need to be improved continuously. It is also crucial to 
set up firewall to filter useless information and keep 
recording the security log and check if there is a 
security attack. 
Compared with passive attacks, active attacks are much 
more difficult to defend but much easier to detect. It is crucial 
that, the CAV designers and car manufacturers always 
carefully consider all the possible flaws in the CAV systems 
and protocols. 
According to the description above, based on the computer 
cyber security category, the main attack CAV may face are 
from 6 types, which range from the hardware part to software 
part. 
III. THE ATTACKS CAUSED BY CAV 
Despite of the attacks CAV may face, CAV could also be a 
security risk in our daily life. It has been reported that Tesla in 
USA caused fatality indirectly [19]. Except from the physical 
damage caused by CAV, there still are other risks.  
First of such risks is the violation of privacy. CAV are 
equipped with many different sensors including cameras and 
LIDAR. Cameras are used to take pictures as a method of 
surveying and mapping. The pictures could contain someone’s 
face incidentally, which may be a potential problem of privacy. 
If the pictures and their locations were uploaded to internet by 
someone, there could be an issue of a release of private 
information. 
Moreover, with the increased tensions and conflicts around 
the world, CAV could also be used as a method to conduct 
criminal damage to innocent people. Especially in government, 
military area, the safe usage of CAV should also be enhanced. 
In high risk areas including government military areas, the 
CAV communication channels and frequency should be 
different, and public and commercial CAV should be 
prohibited. 
IV. METHODS TO DEAL WITH ATTACKS 
To avoid these attacks, CAV should follow these 
principles: 
 Authentication. The CAV and service platform should 
be authenticated by each other or by a reliable third 
party company. Every time in the V2X communication 
and the usage of the vehicle, there should be a check 
procedure to verify both identities. The authentication 
process is also important in specific areas such as 
military and government area. Normal CAV should not 
be allowed to enter these areas or communication.  
 Encryption. In message transmissions, all the messages 
should be encrypted to make sure that no one could 
monitor or modify their content. A good encryption 
should be strong enough to prevent decryption. In 
Europe, some tests on encryption in V2X 
communication use public keys [18]. Many encryption 
methods in computer security could be used in the 
V2X communications because we could regard CAV 
as a mobile computer. 
 Standard and Regulation. Despite computer 
technologies which can be used to defend attacks, 
appropriate standards and regulations should also 
adapted to reduce CAV attacks such as the data content 
in V2X communications and the confidentiality of 
information in CAV. For example, when an accident 
happens and causes injuries such as the latest Tesla one 
[19], the responsibility need to properly defined and 
regulated in legislation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Along with the fast development of technologies and 
research in science and engineering, the realization of CAV is 
not far away from being in our daily life. Despite the lots of 
benefits to our daily life, CAV is faced with plenty of cyber 
security threats. This paper discusses different categories of 
cyber security attacks based on existing computer securities 
issues. These include passive attacks and active attacks. 
Possible solutions to deal with these attacks have also been 
proposed. 
Despite the existing research and development of CAV 
technologies, there still are lots of work to do. Extensive 
research to defend CAV cyber security attacks need to be 
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